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Modern civilization is inherently unsustainable, and is thus implicated in the 
progressive annihilation of the natural world. This annihilation is necessary in a system that 
is perpetuated through capitalist notions of economic productivity in which the importation 
of goods is required. As each landbase is only capable of sustaining the life forms that exist 
within its ecosystem, importation means the death of particular ‘other’ bodies and life 
forms. The only possible endpoint for a system which depends on the importation of finite 
resources to support itself is death, and for the first time in history, the possibility of an end 
to all of life on earth is scientifically verifiable (Bahrenberg & Dutkowski, 1993, p. 286).  
Thus, the majority of humans live within urban systems that contain the seed of 
their own destruction, if not the destruction of all other life forms upon which they inter-
depend. This infrastructure is enabled through a neoliberal imperium (Agathangelou and 
Ling, 2002, p. 2) which requires both continual, pre-emptive deaths and the fear of death. A 
starting point for change requires the adoption of an ethics of life. Buddhist understandings 
of the human condition and ecoregionalism, a model for community living grounded in 
such a morality, provide a framework for understanding and action that recognizes the 
inter-dependence of living beings while facing the inevitability and power of death. 
Through this model, acknowledging death becomes a societal practice, one that may be key 
to the continuance of life.  
 Modern industrial society is characterized by its fear of death. In The Order of 
Things, Michel Foucault (2001) argues that, "Homo economicus is not the human being 
who represents his own needs to himself, and the objects capable of satisfying them; he is 
the human being who spends, wears out, and wastes his life in evading the imminence of 
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death” (p. 280). The liberal ideal is eternal life –- immortality secured through the co-
optation of land, at the expense of the beings who live within the natural systems that 
operate within that land. This creation of property is the central act that in turn allows for 
the accumulation of goods and money, which are the physical substances capable of 
existing beyond the death of the individual. In this way modern industrial society partitions 
the natural world into exclusive fragments which in turn feed the need for the permanence 
and control that death seems to threaten, by providing a base of materiality that is expected 
to outlast the mortality of the human accumulator. Thus, fear of death is supplanted by the 
need to control the material world –- and society’s proxy “science, which has as its ultimate 
(and proximate) goal the conversion of the wild and wildly unpredictable natural world into 
something orderly, predictable, and controllable” (Jensen, 2006, p. 161) is one of the means 
that this control is realized. This is reflected in the hope that technology will resolve the 
ecological crises that are part and parcel of modern industrial societies (i.e. that science can 
be the means for remaining unaccountable for the consequences of capitalism). 
  The regulation of bodies through technology is another way that science is used in 
the service of sustaining modern industrial society. As Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller 
explain in their text Biopolitics (1994),  “Modern manufacturing industry, which has often 
been one-sidedly (sic) identified with modernity as such, has been based from the 
beginning on the notion (or rather on the negative utopia) that the machine will not only 
check and overrule human labour but will eventually replace it completely” (p. 14) 
completing the almost total alienation from productive activity (such as the procurement of 
food, water, and shelter) that links individuals with the source of their subsistence. As 
Fehér and Heller (1994) explain: “the systematic deterioration and crippling of the Body in 
industrial work is a constant feature of modern technology” (p. 14). In this way the “God of 
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production,” is “deeply devoted to the conversion of the living to the dead” (Jensen, 2006, 
p. 160).  
An extension of bodies as productive machines, is the regulation of bodies as 
consumers. In modern society money becomes the means through which survival stuffs are 
secured, so that the individual is oriented to corporations and the state as the source of life, 
instead of the earth. This is the way that the modern nation-state has created what Anna M. 
Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling (2009) refer to as “consumer citizenship” (p. 141). This 
consumerism develops the “hungry ghost” aspect within us, a being in Buddhist cosmology 
who “has a tiny mouth, the size of the eye of a needle, a thin neck and throat, skinny arms 
and legs and a gigantic belly. His mouth and neck are too small to let enough food pass 
through them to fill his immense belly, so he is always hungry” (Trungpa, 2002, p. 36). 
This aspect is cultivated in modern industrial society so that “we were periodically bent on 
catering solely to the needs of the continually unsatisfied sensuous, and subsequently, in an 
alternative fit we would try to raise ourselves to the level of the spirit and leave the 
corporeal completely behind” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 9). Such ascetic responses 
demonstrate how consumerism has literally forced the self contained by individual bodies 
to attempt an escape of the body, alienating it not only from the natural world, but also 
from its most direct link to nature – the body itself. 
 Consumerist and technological regulation of bodies, the keystones of modern 
civilization and the ‘civilizing process,’ reduce bodies to economically productive vessels. 
As Fehér and Heller (1994) explain: “an apparently self-contradictory trend underlies the 
‘civilizing process’: it is tantamount to frantic efforts made in order to transform the human 
habitat into a genuinely ‘humanistic’ one by purging every trace of the physical existence 
of humans from it” (p. 16). This human element is the unique, individual, emissary of the 
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natural world that is purged. Indeed, “the ‘lost element’ is the sense of the uniqueness of the 
corporeal existence (including the uniqueness of each individual), the capacity of grasping 
the wonder of the body which exists only once and which defies generalized norms and 
scientific explanations” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 18). In these ways we are made ex-
nature, ex-land, and through the loss of and change in our relationship to the natural world, 
and even to our own bodies, made into ex-humans (Biehl, 2005, p. 317).   
This is accomplished through the attempted elimination of all life, human and non-
human alike – the (un)natural result of unchecked consumerism. Indeed, the very promise 
of modernity is “the complete mastery of nature” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 1) in addition to 
the “liberation of the Body” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 8). However, unique to this time in 
history is that, “not only do we still have the same old difficulties as had our ancestors with 
repressing, silencing and sublimating the ‘nature in us,’ but in addition we face an 
ecological crisis outside” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 1). 
Through these processes, not all bodies are equal. This is true of both the ‘Other,’ 
that body which is most productive for the elite of the Global North to maintain in the 
periphery, with the most minimized access possible to recourse and autonomy, and of select 
nonhuman bodies, perhaps the most killable bodies of all. Judith Butler explores the 
meaning of this exclusion and violence by asking:  
 
How then can one think through the matter of bodies as a kind of materialization 
governed by regulatory norms in order to ascertain the workings of heterosexual 
hegemony in the formation of what qualifies as a viable body? How does that 
materialization of the norm in bodily formation produce a domain of abjected 
bodies, a field of deformation, which, in failing to qualify as the fully human, 
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fortifies those regulatory norms? What challenge does that excluded and abjected 
realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of 
what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as ‘life,’ lives worth 
protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? (Butler, 1999, p. 243) 
 
Thus, the continual destruction of wild life through the pollution of food sources, 
water, and land, the mass elimination of wild spaces such as old growth forests, the drying 
up of rivers through the construction of dams, the enslavement of animals in industrial 
agriculture all depends upon the exclusion of animals in relation to the model body of the 
human (which itself is subjected to safety from or membership in the abjected realm of 
bodies that do not matter). 
I suggest that the possibility for averting this kind of a death lies in the adoption of 
an ethics of life that is grounded in the natural world. In Endgame: The Problem of 
Civilization (2006) Jensen proposes an ethics that starts, literally, from the ground up. His 
starting point is the inalienable goodness of copious amounts of fresh, clean water (p. 31). 
For him, the foundation of morality has to acknowledge first and foremost, “I am an animal 
who requires habitat” (Jensen, 2006, p. 32). He goes on to explain: 
 
If I understand that as human animals we require healthy landbases for not only 
physical but also emotional health, how will I perceive the morality of mass 
extinction? How does the understanding that humans and salmon thrived here in 
Tu’nes for at least twelve thousand years affect my perception of the morality of the 
existence of dams, deforestation, or anything else that destroys this long-term 
symbiosis by destroying salmon? (p. 32) 
 6 
 
 This natural symbiosis is the basis for the notion of interdependence in Buddhist 
thought, which is the conception of, “reality as a dynamic interaction of mutually 
conditioning events, (that) posits no prime cause or unconditioned absolute to which 
occurrences can be traced in a linear fashion” (Macy, 1992, p. 18). This concept is mirrored 
in an understanding of bodies as fluid and co-created entities. What Judith Butler proposes 
in “Bodies That Matter” (1999), “is a return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, 
but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of 
boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (Butler, 1999, p. 239). This interdependence 
and co-arising of phenomenon challenges the notion of a fixed “I” which exists separate 
from the world, and thus separate from others. This is the state that Agathangelou and Ling 
refer to as a “multi-and trans-subjectivity” (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009, p. 130), the “(‘I in 
you and you in me’) where selves and others reverberate with one another to construct a 
mutual subjectivity” (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009, p. 130). This inter-being of all things 
connotes a responsibility to others, as “our mutual embeddedness makes us mutually 
accountable” (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009, p. 86). Thus, an ethics that acknowledges our 
place within natural systems, as an animal with physical and emotional needs that are 
shared with others and which are experienced and obtained only in the context of 
relationship with others, creates the conditions for a life that is sustainable and moral. 
Ecoregionalism is a model that puts these ethics into practice. In “An Ecoregional 
Strategy Towards a Fault-Tolerant Human-Environment Relationship,” authors Gerhard 
Bahrenberg and Marek Dutkowski propose a strategy of ecoregionalism that manifests the 
principles of worldism, meaning it “shifts attention away from essentialized, reified 
structures that produce a unified, socio-political world order, state structures, and collective 
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subjectivities...Worldism reorients our attention to the multiplicity of social ontologies at 
play and their power politics” (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009, p. 125). Ecoregionalism helps 
in the movement towards the “multiplicity of social ontologies” by transferring the 
decision-making for a given locality to those who live there. Given that the ecological 
destructiveness of modern civilization lies in its importation of resources from the 
landbases of others, ecoregionalism attempts to “keep human intervention in the natural 
environment within the limits of its buffering capacity” (Bahrenberg & Dutkowski, 1993, p. 
289) by mapping out the areas required for communities of people to have “enough natural 
resources to become self-sufficient, which is a pre-requisite for autonomy” (Bahrenberg & 
Dutkowski, 1993, p. 290).  
In order for this mapping to not in and of itself form another type of violence it is 
essential to allow the people (and even the land, the animals and the plants) that live within 
a community to play a role in the determination of these boundaries, so that “only those 
people can participate in decision-making processes who live in the territory where the 
problem to be solved is located,” thus, “competence is founded – among other things – on 
the territorial membership of people” (Bahrenberg & Dutkowski, 1993, p. 292). In addition 
this model calls for the development of autonomous households, which provide a self-
supply of food to its members, thus increasing self-sufficiency and relieving the burden on 
industrial agriculture to provide foodstuffs (Bahrenberg & Dutkowski, 1993, p. 293).  
These are only a few possibilities that exist using ecoregionalism as a frame to 
contemplate next steps.  What is powerful about this re-localization of decision-making and 
sufficiency is the way that it embodies many aspects of an ethics of life: it reaffirms the 
community’s interdependence with the natural world by bringing the resources necessary 
for life into the proximity of home; it places responsibility for decision-making on those 
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who will directly benefit or experience the consequences of those decisions, thus 
facilitating growth, learning and responsibility, and it acknowledges that the human animal 
requires a habitat that is life fulfilling. 
Civilization is sustained through the fear of death, which is really to say that it is 
sustained through the fear of bodies and natural systems, all of which operate according to 
cycles and influences that are outside the jurisdiction of economic control and therefore 
threaten the existence of the eternal, rational, property-owning individual upon which 
modern industrial society depends. 
It is no accident that the endgame for this type of is not only its own obliteration, 
but the obliteration of the entire world, the violent, avoidable ecological collapse that faces 
us now: a mega-death that brings about the very thing that capitalist society has been 
constructed to deny. 
Thus, this fear of death is creating the very conditions for the death that is feared. 
Averting the death of ourselves, if not all other creatures and life forms, requires an 
acceptance of death, and through that, the adoptation of an ethics of life that is grounded in 
the natural world. Ecoregionalism is a model that puts these concepts into practice. This 
transformation will not be easy, but it is essential and needs to be practical. As Trungpa 
explains,  
 
Treading the spiritual path is painful. It is a constant unmasking, peeling off of layer 
after layer of masks. It involves insult after insult. Such a series of disappointments 
inspires us to give up ambition. We fall down and down and down, until we touch 
the ground, until we relate with the basic sanity of earth...When we are grounded, 
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there is no room for dreaming or frivolous impulse, so our practice at last becomes 
workable. (Trungpa, 2002, p. 6) 
 
The possibilities of transformation explored throughout this paper mean more then 
mere survival – they are key to the realization of a kind of dignity that our overdetermined 
participation in the destruction of our world denies us. In fact, the end of this civilization, as 
we have understood it so far, may be the very thing required to bring us home: to ourselves 
and to each other. 
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